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By: Gaurang Bhatt
March 12, 2006
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It is very clear that the five permanent members of the UN Security
Council wish to retain their uniquely powerful status after their victory
in WW2. America, the primum inter pares does not ever wish to have a rival
like the Soviet Union exercising a balance of terror through Mutually
Assured Destruction, as clearly spelt out in the Bush Security Doctrine of
2002. It wants Israel as the only nuclear power in the Middle East with
unchallenged hegemony but its surrogate. The relative tolerance towards
India is to build it up as a counter to China emerging as a rival. Thus
the nuclear deal is to hamper India’s rise to an independent nuclear power
by using its energy, infrastructure and technology needs to curb its
ascent. This is why it wants to put all its reactors and particularly the
Fast Breeder Reactors under the IAEA inspection regime and nix further
nuclear weapon testing and limit its stockpile by the fissile material
stockpile control.
It would require nearly 25 % of India’s defense budget to have a
completely operational nuclear triad. Britain is having second thoughts
about spending huge resources to replace its Tridents and looking at
alternative options. Britain can do that because it is assured a place
under the US nuclear umbrella. One doesn’t see France considering the same
options. Thus despite the cost India needs a second strike capability by
SLBMs especially with its no first use doctrine. Thus having four to six
nuclear submarines with SLBMs covering Pakistan and China is a priority
irrespective of costs. This mandates FBRs capable of producing more
Plutonium or U233 than they use to achieve fissile material independence
and deterrent.
The ABM technology is unreliable and can be easily overcome by swamping
with a large mixture of decoys and nuclear tipped missiles. China is sure
to provide those to Pakistan covertly if not overtly as it has done in the
past with bomb design and cruise missiles. The other problem is the short
15 minute time window to counter Pakistani or Chinese missiles. America
has a much larger time window to counter North Korean or Iranian nuclear
missiles. Thus India while acquiring some ABMs to reduce damage would be
much better off using its scarce resources on MAD and second strike
capability. The same arguments hold against spending scarce resources on
tactical and theater mini-nuclear weapons as their use is likely to use of
strategic weapons by Pakistan or China.
Finally a 45000 ton carrier with about 20 aircraft and two ASW helicopters
will need to utilize all the copters and four of its fighters for its own
protection. In addition it will need a hunter killer submarine or two and
a frigate, a destroyer and a supply ship flotilla for effective operation.
Even then only eight aircraft per shift at the most will be available for
attack. Furthermore a lucky cruise missile hit can cause a two billion
dollar loss. This is the reason that Britain, France, China and Russia are
not building more carriers and America is building larger carriers with 70
to 90 attack aircraft. Thus resources could be better used by having a
larger number of hunter killer submarines all equipped with air
independent propulsion to provide greater silence and longer operational
times to counter enemy surface and submerged vessels.
Since future Indian ambitions are to cover the seas from the Straits of
Hormuz to Malacca and the Bay of Bengal, in view of its long coastline and
the Laccadive and Andaman islands, it makes sense to have adequate air and
naval bases from which surveillance and attack aircraft and surface and
submarine flotillas could dominate the seas all the way to the
international maritime boundaries of the littoral nations of these two
water bodies. Thus two 45000 ton carriers with 20 fixed wing aircraft are
more than enough for prestige and power protection and may even be too
many in view of limited resources and greater priorities.
Gaurang Bhatt
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